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RECENT CASES
EASEMENTS-SERVITUDEs-TAx SALE OF SERVIENT ESTATE. Plaintiff
made a grant of the land in question, inserting as a condition that no
liquor should ever be sold on the premises. Subsequently the land was
sold at a tax sale. The defendant is the grantee of the purchaser at
the tax sale and is now using the premises for a beer tavern. Plaintiff
owns property appurtenant to the defendant and now seeks to enjoin
him from so using the land. Held: The defendant will be enjoined, since
the restriction on the use of the land constitutes a negative easement
which was not extinguished by the tax sale. Northwestern Improvement
Co. v. Lowry, 66 P. (2d) 792 (Mont., 1937).
The prevailing opinion seems to be that a tax-title is a new title,
and not merely the sum of old titles and hence it is generally held that
a sale and conveyance in due form for taxes divests all interest in the
land sold and vests in the grantee an independent and paramount title.
Bassett v. City of Spokane, 98 Wash. 654, 168 Pac. 478 (1917); 3 COOLEY,
TAXATION (4th ed.) § 1494. Thus where the whole title is sold it cuts
off and divests estates in remainder or reversion, rent charges, trust
estates, homestead interests, inchoate rights of dower, mortgages, and
judgment liens. Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 Atl. 351;
note (1924) 40 A. L. R. 1516. However, most of the courts do not extend
the doctrine to include easements, and while the cases are not all agreed
upon the question the prevailing view seems to be that a sale of land for
taxes does not 'extinguish easements to which the land is subject. Tax
Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 636
(1914); 3 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed.) § 1494. No distinction is made
in the cases between negative and affirmative easements and the courts
protect easements of light and air equally as well as rights of access
over the adjoining lands of another. The basis of the rule in most of
the courts that recognize the doctrine is that taxes are levied merely
on the servient estate and that the sale of the land for taxes passes
title to only the servient estate; that is, the land subject to the easement.
Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, supra. Cases from other jurisdictions disre-
gard the nature of the tax levy and merely say that the person taxed
had no title to the easement which could be divested. Stansell v. Amer-
ican Radiator Co., 163 Mich. 528, 128 N. W. 789 (1910).
Even where statutes relating to tax sales provide that the purchaser
at such sales obtains an absolute title free from all incumbrances most
of the courts have said that this goes no further than to invest the
purchaser with the title that the owner of the property had, free from
liens by the way of incumbrances placed thereon and does not divest
easements acquired prior to the levying of the tax under which the sale
was made. Blenis v. Utica Knitting Co., 210 N. Y. 561, 104 N. E. 1127
(1914).
In a minority of jurisdictions the view is taken that a valid sale of
land for taxes extinguishes a private easement to which the land is
subject on the ground that the purchaser at a tax sale is clothed with
a new and complete title in the land. Such has been the result in
Washington under the statute, REm. REV. STAT. § 11260, which provides
that a tax lien shall have priority to and be fully paid and satisfied
before any recognizance, mortgage, judgment, debt, obligation or re-
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sponsibility to or with which the land may become charged. In con-
struing this statute the court held that when foreclosure of such a lien
is made, and real estate is sold thereunder, the fee passes to the pur-
chaser, and all grants made by the owner of the fee fall with the fore-
closure. Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911). While the
court observed in that case that the defendants, prior to the foreclosure
proceedings, might have had the land upon which their easement was
located segregated, and a pro tanto reduction of the tax made under the
statute, nevertheless the decision rests upon the principle that the tax
is a paramount lien, and its foreclosure cuts off all charges upon the
real estate. Similar results have been obtained in other states, but
without the benefit of such a sweeping statute as in Washington. Smn4th
v. Griffin, 14 Colo. 429, 23 Pac. 905 (1890); Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595,
65 Atl. 413 (1906); Nedderman v. City of Des -Moines, 268 N. W. 36
(Iowa, 1936).
It seems that in the instant case the Montana court has reached the
right result, for in making the assessment, a deduction was made for
easements, which properly was taxable against the plaintiff, the owner of
the easement, and not against the servient estate. Hence, when the tax
sale was held title to the servient estate alone passed to the purchaser
and not the easement.
W. G.
SALES-TRUST REcEIPTS-RECORDrNG. An automobile dealer finances
the purchases of automobiles as follows: the dealer orders the cars and
pays the manufacturer 10 per cent; the automobiles are shipped; the
dealer signs a trust receipt in favor of the finance, company and gets the
bill of lading; the finance company pays the balance due to the manu-
facturer and gets the bill of sale to the automobiles running directly
to it, together with a promissory note signed by the dealer running
directly to the finance company; the dealer presents the bill of lading,
gets the automobiles and places them on his sales floor. The trust receipt,
In typical form, provides that the automobiles belong to the finance
company and will be returned to it upon demand, that risk of loss is
upon the dealer, and that the automobiles will not be sold or encum-
bered without the prior release of the finance company. The trust receipt
was not recorded or filed. In a contest between the finance company and
the dealer's assignee for benefit of creditors, held that the trust receipt
was either a chattel mortgage or conditional sale (without deciding
which) and as it was neither recorded nor filed, the assignee prevails.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Seattle Association of Credit Men,
90 Wash. Dec. 257, - P. (2d) - (1937).
The trust receipt is not a conditional sales contract. Upon breach of
a conditional sales contract, the vendor can either retake the goods, or
sue for the balance due, but he cannot both repossess and seek judgment
for any deficiency. Jones Short Motor Co. v. Bolin, 153 Wash. 198, 279
Pac. 395 (1929). The trust receipt transaction, however, allows the
financing house to retake the goods, resell, and sue the dealer for any
balance due. Charavay i Bodin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 819
(1909). Further, under a conditional sale, so long as the vendee is not
In default, the vendor has no right to the goods; whereas the trust
receipt itself provides that the financing party may retake the goods at
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any time, and the courts will evidently respect the agreement of the
parties. Ivy v. Commercial Credit Co., 173 Wash. 360, 23 P. (2d) 19
(1933). Finally, looking at the problem functionally, the trust receipt
transaction is not a conditional sale because the finance company is
merely lending credit. It is not in the business of selling goods. The
actual sale is between the manufacturer and the dealer, rather than
between the finance company and the dealer, and the Washington court
has held that the only function of the conditional sale is to permit the
owner of personal property to make a bona fide sale on credit and not
merely to secure the extension of credit by one other than the vendor.
Lahn & Simmons v. Matzen Woolen Mills, 147 Wash. 560, 266 Pac. 697
(1928).
Nor is the trust receipt transaction a chattel mortgage. In the latter,
title originally must have been in the mortgagor, and by virtue of the
mortgage, the borrower conveys a property interest in the goods to
the lender. Not so in the trust receipt. Here the lender's property inter-
est is conveyed to him not by the borrower but by a third party. Fur-
ther, under a trust receipt, upon the dealer's failure to return the goods
after demand by the financer, the proper remedy would be replevin,
whereas property under a chattel mortgage can only be obtained by
foreclosure proceedings. Ward v. Warner, 91 Wash. Dec. 501, - P. (2d)
-- (1937).
In Ivy v. Commercial Credit Co., supra, a similar case, the court took
the position that there was no need for recording or filing a trust
receipt, distinguishing the instant case from that holding by stressing
the fact that in the earlier case there was no showing that the dealer
made any down payment or gave a negotiable note for the balance to
the finance company. These distinctions would not appear to be so
operative as to require an opposite holding in the case now under consid-
eration.
While it may 'be desirable in some manner to make trust receipt ar-
rangements a matter of public record in order to avoid secret liens, it is
submitted that such a transaction should be recognized as distinct from
other credit devices, and that the proper method of requiring filing or
recording is by legislation rather than by trying to fit a distinguishable
legal concept into the old form of either conditional sale or chattel
mortgage. It may be easy enough to call it one or the other for the
purpose of requiring recording, but in determining the rights of the
parties to a trust receipt transaction, any attempt to draw an analogy
to either a chattel mortgage or conditional sale will lead to illogical
conclusions and results absolutely inconsistent with the intent of the
parties to such an instrument.
In view of the fact that the cases in this state are in conflict, it
might be advisable for the legislature to consider the adoption of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act which provides a satisfactory solution to
the problem. It recognizes the trust receipt as a distinct species, and
provides for filing with the Secretary of State a statement by the trustor
to the effect that the two parties are engaging in credit dealings of this
type. This is all the notice that is required, and is sufficient to protect
the parties in all transactions of the same type for the ensuing year.
C. P.
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BILs AND NOTES-INTERPRETATION: PAYABLE TO BEARER. An agent by
means of checks which he wap empowered to draw on his principal's
account obtained in return from plaintiff bank cashier's checks drawn
on plaintiff and payable to certain persons whom the agent designated.
Although such persons did exist, the agent neither delivered nor intended
to deliver the checks to them, but instead indorsed them'first in the
name of the payees and then in his own name and deposited them. to his
credit in defendant bank, which, after stamping, the clearing house
indorsement on the back- "all prior indorsements guaranteed", received
a credit on -the plaintiff bank through the clearing house. Upon discover-
ing the employee's defalcations plaintiff voluntarily paid its depositor
the amount of the agent's misappropriation and took an assignment of
Its rights. He-d: Plaintiff cannot recover from -the defendant since the
checks were bearer paper and consequently there was no need of indorse-
ments which defendant could be held as guaranteeing. Union Bank &
Trust Co. of Los Angeles v. Security First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles,
-Cal.-, 65 P. (2d) 355 (1937).
The case involves an interpretation of section 9 (3) of the N. I. L.,
providing that an instrument is payable to bearer "when it is payable
to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was
known to the person making It so payable." CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering,
1933) 3090 (3). This is substantially a codification of the rule of the law
merchant, Minet v. Gibsoi4 1 H. B1. 569, 126 Eng. Rep. 366 (1791) and
it is now well settled that a "fictitious payee" as used by the statute was
intended by the framers to include as bearer paper a bill drawn payable
to an actual person, but never intended by the drawer to be paid to him,
Onyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atl. 876, 128
Am. St. Rep. 780 (1908). Generally cases arising under this section
which involve the problem of a procuring party inducing a nominal
drawer to make checks payable to designated payees occur when the
procuring party is an agent of the nominal drawer. If the principal is
found to be negligent in these cases, many'jurisdictions cast the loss
upon him, Deflance Lbr. Co. v. Bank of California, 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.
(2d) 135 (1935); Note (1935) 99 A. L. R. 439. However where the
principal acts without such negligence there Is a diversity of opinion as
to whether the loss should fall upon the principal or the accepting bank.
Some courts, following the reasoning of United States Cold Storage Co. v.
Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343fll. 503, 175 N. E. 825, 74 A. L. R. 811 (1931),
hold the intention of the agent is not imputable to the employer so as
to render applicable the rule of Sni/der v. Corn Exchange Bank, supra.
A majority of the courts come to a contrary conclusion on two lines of
reasoning: either the agent's knowledge of the fictitious payee Is imputed
to the principal, American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332
Mo. 98, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034 (1932); or "person making it so payable" is
construed to refer not to the nominal maker, but the agent who drew
the instrument, Mueller and Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218
S. W. 465 (1920); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank &
Union Trust Co., 1 Cal. App. (2d) 694, 37 P. (2d) 483 (1934), Note (1931)
74 A. L. R. 822.
Although instant case differs from the usual situation in that the pro-
curing party was not the agent of the ostensible drawer, the California
court in holding the nominal drawer liable relied chiefly on the case of
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Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wells, supra, and cases cited therein. As
an explanation of the present case, obviously the majority theory of
imputation cannot be carried over. The second theory has been limited
by most jurisdictions to actual signers and such courts have held that
an agent who merely prepares a list of payees is not "the person making
it so payable", City of St. Paul v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 151 Minn. 485,
187 N. W. 516 (1922). However the California court did not expressly
adopt either rationalization, but significantly stated, "While it is true
that the maker of the cashier's checks in question was the (plaintiff),
still it was the faithless employee's intent that must govern, because
the bank made the cashier's checks payable to the parties designated by
(him). The (plaintiff's) intent was to make the cashier's checks payable
to the parties that (the employee) intended them to be payable to. (Tihe
employee), therefore, was the real drawer and 'the person making it so
payable' as to each cashier's check."
In a case involving this problem it is manifest that arguments of
policy are as pertinent as the conclusions drawn from legal logic. The
California court states: "otherwise those who put checks and drafts into
circulation would have it in their power by collusive understandings
incapable of proof to conduct illegitimate transactions and hold the
depository liable upon proof of the forgery of the name of the payee
never intended in fact to be a payee."
W. M. L.
TRADE UNIONS-REVOCATION OF CHARTER-RESORT TO COURTS. A member
of the executive board of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, purportedly acting on behalf of that body, revoked
the charter of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers of Kelso-Longview
No. 2504 without notice or a hearing and without preferring any charges
against the local or against any of its officers. The Brotherhood then
issued charters to other locals and threatened to seize and turn over to
these locals the money and property of Local 2504, which it would have
been justified in doing if the expulsion of 2504 were lawful. Plaintiff
local prayed for a judgment declaring the charter issued to it to be a
valid and subsisting charter. The Brotherhood argued that plaintiff
local had no right to invoke the jurisdiction of the court without first
attempting to assert some remedy within the Brotherhood. Held: The
charter of plaintiff union was never validly revoled and the local
still existed as a union. James Cox v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, 90 Wash. Dec. 459, - P. (2d) - (1937).
The constitution and the by-laws of a labor union or other voluntary
association express the terms of a contract which defines the privileges
secured and the duties assumed by those who become members. The
individual's rights of membership are founded on this contract, which,
if accepted at all, must be accepted in toto. For this reason the con-
stitution and bylaws constitute the sole rule which governs the relations
between the association and its members. Flynn v. Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen, 111 Kan. 415, 207 Pac. 829 (1922); Polin v. Koploni, 257
N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931). It follows that before applying to a
court of equity for reinstatement, a disfranchised member or local must
as a rule exhaust all remedies available under the laws of the associa-
tion. Shapiro v. Geblman, 152 Misc. 13, 272 N. Y. S. 624 (1934); Austin
vt. Dutcher, 56 App. Div. 393, 67 N. Y. S. 819; Greenwood v. Building
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Trades Council of Sacramento, et al., 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823
(1925). But this rule does not apply where the expelled member or
local has, in effect, been denied due process of law. Thus, where as in
the instant case, the expulsion takes place without notice to the accused
or without an opportunity to be heard, the courts may be resorted to
In the first instance. Rueb v. Rehder et al., 24 N. M. 532, 174 Pac. 992
(1918); Neal v. Hutcheson et al., 160 N. Y. S. 1007 (1916). The same is
true if the procedure is irregular or in violation of any of the rules of
the constitution or by-laws. Carey et al. v. International Brotherhood of,
Paper Makers et al., 123 Misc. 680, 206 N. Y. S. 73 (1924); Rueb v.
Rehder, supra. Likewise, where the remedy provided by the law of the
society is not available to the member, as where the appellate body
would not convene until about one and a half years after the expulsion,
out of the state, and at a great distance. Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405,
103 N. Y. S. 1003. Or where there is an extremely remote possibility of
the remedy being effective, as when the appeal within the organization
-was before a board so constituted as to afford no likelihood of an im-
partial hearing. Rodier et al. v. Huddell et al., 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.
Y. S. 336 (1931). Or where no remedy is provided by the laws of the
association or the procedure outlined is so expensive, slow, and compli-
cated as to amount to a denial of justice. Local Lodge No. 104 of Inter-
national Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers
of America et al. v. International Brotherhood, of Boiler Makers, Iron
Ship Builders and Helpers of A-erica et al., 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328
(1930). Any rules or by-laws providing for the expulsion of a member
without notice and preferment of charges and trial is invalid and all
proceedings taken under it null and void. Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc.
552, 179 N. Y. S. 1 (1919).
The court will not determine the merits of the controversy. It will
search the record to see whether the member has had fair notice and
opportunity to be heard and whether the association has properly admin-
istered its own rules, and if so, it will not go into the facts, to the end
that it may substitute its judgment for that of the organization. Gilmore
v. Palmer, supra. The property interest mentioned in the cases as a
prerequisite to equitable jurisdiction is amply met under the facts of
the instant case.
W. G. D.
I
APPEAL AND ERROR-OBJECTIONS-EFFECT OF FAILURE TO MAKE. The
state's attorney in opening a prosecution for murder stated, "in view
of other burglaries and the records that will show from the evidence,
the state is going to ask you to hang these two men." No objection was
made at the time by defendant to the statement.' The defendants were
convicted. Held: The statement constituted reversible error in that it
placed defendants' character in issue in advance of their taking the
stand, sought conviction on other grounds than the offense charged, and
compelled defendants to testify; and, although the defense raised no
objection, to do so would have been futile, for an instruction could not
have cleared the mind of the jury; and, even though the defendants were
admittedly guilty so that the error were not prejudicial to them, if it
were allowed to stand it would be a precedent for other errors of the
same nature. Two justices dissented. State v. O'Donnell, 91 Wash. Dec.
447, - P. (2d) - (1937).
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This question of the necessity of a timely objection in the lower court
to save an error for appeal has been repeatedly passed upon. In state
jurisdictions the overwhelming weight of authority holds the general
rule to be that "Though improper language of counsel for the state may
constitute a sufficient ground for reversal, it cannot be considered on
appeal unless the proper preliminary steps have been taken." Note
46 L. R. A. 642. There are several exceptions to this general rule. In
the case of infants a majority of the courts hold an objection in the
lower court is not necessary on the theory that infants are wards of the
court, and the court is bound to protect their interests notwithstanding
the failure of their attorney to do so. Note Ann. Cas. 1913B 443. But a
minority hold the infant to the same rules as an adult especially where
counsel acted in entire good faith without fraud. Byrnes v. Butte Brew-
ing Co., 44 Mont. 328, 119 Pac. 788, Ann. Cas. 1913B 440, and note 445
(1911). Also a majority have taken cognizance of an error improperly
brought up if a failure to have done so would have resulted in a gross
miscarriage of justice. Klink v. People, 16 Colo. 467, 27 Pac. 1062 (1891).
But in order to justify the court in setting aside a verdict of the jury,
it is necessary that the jury have been influenced by the erroneous re-
marks, and that they contributed to the verdict found. State v. John-
son, 48 La. Ann. 87, 19 So. 213 (1896). Some state legislatures have
given the appellate courts power by statute to order a new trial, though
no exception was taken, where it is clear defendant has been prejudiced
by improper language of the district attorney, N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§§ 527, 528; People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520, 22 N. E. 180 (1889). In
Oregon the defendant has a remedy in such a case under OREGON Crvm
CODE § 232, subd. 1; State v. Abravrs, 11 Ore. 172, 8 Pac. 327 (1883).
In the federal courts the general rule has been modified by Rule 11
of the rules of procedure giving the courts power to notice errors not
properly preserved, but this rule has been construed to be only an ex-
ception with definite bounds. Thus in Borderland Coal Sales Co. v.
Imperial Coal Sales Co., 7 F. (2d) 116 (1925), the court stated, "An ap-
pellate court can consider only errors to which objections have been
made and exceptions taken in the trial court. The only exception to
this general rule is in criminal cases where federal courts of review
may sometimes, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and to pre-
vent miscarriage of justice, notice error in the trial to which no excep-
tions or objections have been taken."
The rule in Washington until the case in hand was well in line with
the majority, the court stating in State v. Vogel, 183 Wash. 664, 49 P.
(2d) 473 (1935), "It could at most be nothing more than misconduct
on the part of the attorney, and we have repeatedly held this not ground
for setting aside the verdict, unless the court was asked to correct it
and the request was disregarded by the court." State v. Stevens, 135
Wash. 361, 237 Pac. 723 (1925). The majority exception to avoid a mis-
carriage of justice found support also in State v. Navone, 186 Wash. 532,
58 P. (2d) 1208 (1936), for although this case was cited in support of the
O'Donnell decision it must be differentiated-in the Navone case the
court found the evidence "nicely balanced" while in the O'Donnell case
the court was free to admit that the evidence without question sup-
ported the judgment. It would seem that the court in the O'Donnell case,
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by announcing the rule that if an error occurred in the trial which
might be prejudicial, the conviction cannot .be affirmed although the
error was not objected to at the time it was made, has abandoned the
general rule in regard to making objections and has overruled such
decisions as State v. Regan, 8 Wash. 506, 36 Pac. 472 (1894), where the
court in referring to an improper argument of the prosecutor in a
murder trial stated, "counsel for defendant excepted to it, but it does
not appear that he moved to strike it or asked the court to instruct
the jury to disregard it. Consequently there is no foundation for any
error in the premises. Furthermore, it does not appear that such state-
ment could have been prejudicial to defendant in any manner."
W. M. L.
CONTEMPT--AFFmAVIT BASED ON INFonmATION AND BEE . -Am affi-
davit was filed in the trial court in which the defendant was charged
with having committed a constructive contempt of court for publishing
a contemptuous article on the activities and motives of the grand jury
investigating county officials. The affidavit contained allegations made
only on information and belief of the affiant. Held: Constructive con-
tempt allegation in an affidavit need not be made on personal knowledge.
Ex parte Reilly, 61 P. (2d) 469 (Cal. App., 1936).
The courts are divided on the question of whether an' allegation in
a constructive contempt affidavit must be based on personal knowledge
or merely on information and belief. The better decided cases, however,
deny that Information and belief is sufficient. Robinson v;. State, 20 Ala.
App. 514, 104 Go. 561 (1904); Herdman a;. State, 31 Neb. 429, 48 N. W.
61 (1898). See also L. R. A. 19170, 854. Contempt proceedings are sum-
mary in their character and in the case of indirect or constructive con-
tempts they are commenced similar to ordinary criminal prosecutions.
However, the law does not proceed as cautiously nor show such solicitude
for a contemnor as it does for others charged with crime. The defendant
has no right to trial by jury and no appeal in many jurisdictions may
be taken from the judgment rendered, which, under the law Is final and
conclusive on the facts, and may be reviewed only under, the limited
process of certiorari or habeas corpus where the appellate court can
only consider if the trial court had proper jurisdiction and whether the
alleged contemptuous conduct constituted contempt at law. Gompers v.
U. S., 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup'. Ct. 693, 58 L. ed. 1115 (1913). Also the
courts have never recognized that many of the customary constitutional
guarantees of an accused are applicable to contempt proceedings. In re
Debs, 158 U. S. 594, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. ed. 1092 (1895) (no right of
trial by jury); Merchants Stock, etc. Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20
(1912) (defendant cannot assert double jeopardy); U. S. v. Toledo News-
Paper Co., 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 62 L. ed. 1186 (1918) (right
of freedom. of speech and of press no defense). See generally THoMEAs,
PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, 9.
When a contemnor is stripped of so many of his rights and the pro-
cedure is so summary the least that should be required is that the affi-
davit be sworn to by one who has personal knowledge of the alleged
contempt and that information and belief merely is not enough. In
Ex parte Landry, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 440, 144 S. W. 964 (1912) the court held
the latter device insufficient because such affidavits are mere hearsay
308 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
in so far as they attempt to convey any proof of the facts therein stated
and may amount to no more than mere recitation of public rumor or
common gossip. Such an affidavit is not a statement of any positive fact,
except the information and belief of the party making it. The charge
must .be specific and direct and not based on hearsay, since no one should
be required to face an essential criminal charge based only upon the belief
of a private prosecutor. State v. Conn, 37 Ore. 596, 62 Pac. 289 (1900).
In view of the holding of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Can-
nut, 26 Wash. 68, 66 Pac. 130 (1900), where it was said, "Before the
court can assume jurisdiction of such a proceeding, it must receive its
information through the affidavit of some one who is prepared to state
the facts without referring to a third party as his informant", it would
seem that this jurisdiction would likewise disapprove of the result
reached in the instant case.
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